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Proposition 8 at the Supreme Court-Marriage Equality-Part I

March 27, 2013

Proposition 8 at the Supreme Court-Marriage Equality -Part I

 

By R Tamara de Silva

March 27, 2013

 

       The Supreme Court has not delved into marriage lightly, tending to defer to state governments.  While marriage is one of the most democratic and universal states shared across almost all cultures, socio-economic strata, ethnicities and religions, it remains withheld to one group in America.  In the United States, marriage is a legal contract that confers specific treatment in tax, probate and property law. This week, the United States Supreme Court begins to consider the constitutionality of marriage between people of the same gender.  The first topic on marriage equality to be covered this week is Proposition 8 followed by the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") on Wednesday.  The Court may potentially decide whether one specific group of people can be treated differently when it comes to one right.  Perhaps it may even consider whether marriage is an unenumerated right.  Alternatively, the Court may defer the issue and rule on narrow grounds of the standing -that the Petitioners cannot bring their defense of Proposition 8 to the Court.     Yesterday, the highest Court heard oral arguments on California's ban on same sex marriages called Proposition 8 in the case of Hollingsworth v. Perry.[1]

       Gay marriage is more polarizing than any other of the other social issues that divide the political right and left except abortion.  In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court considers whether California's Proposition 8, which prohibits marriage between people of the same sex or gender, violates the United States Constitution and whether the advocates of Proposition 8 have legal standing to speak on the matter.  

       Prior to November 8, 2008 when Proposition became law by amending the Constitution of the State of California to eliminate the right to same-sex couples to marry, same sex marriage was, albeit briefly, legal in California.  The District Court struck down Proposition 8 finding that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because there was no rational basis for the state to deny the status of marriage to same-sex couples and also because Proposition 8 violated the Due Process Clause in that California had no compelling interest in denying the right of marriage to same-sex couples.

       States can legally enact laws, which treat different people differently, under the Fourteenth Amendment so long as there is a legitimate governmental interest or a rational interest for their doing so.   This is not a particularly high standard to meet.  However, when the government enacts measures to treat people differently based upon differences between them like, their race, the courts have applied a higher standard of scrutiny upon the laws, one which is called "heightened scrutiny," this is more than having to merely show a rational interest.  It is unclear under which standard the Court will scrutinize Proposition 8, which is clearly discriminatory to same-sex couples, based upon their being same-sex couples.

       Proposition 8 allows same-sex couples to do pretty much everything the status of being married in California confers such as; raising children together, constructive parentage, being able to adopt each other's children, becoming foster parents, filing joint state taxes, enjoying group health plans, having rights to hospital visitation, making medical decisions, being able to sue for wrongful death, and being conservator on their same-sex partner's estate.  Same sex couples in California can do everything married couples can do under Proposition 8, except be given the title of "married."

       Proponents of Proposition 8 argued that its purposes were to advance California's interest in responsible procreation and childrearing.  They argued that this interest justified giving same-sex couples all the activities and interests of married couples, save for the title and stature of marriage. 

       The Court of Appeals did not rule over whether the goals and rationale for Proposition 8 were legitimate state interests that though discriminatory, survived an analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment because it pointed out that Proposition 8 did not remove all the childrearing rights of same-sex couples that existed prior to its enactment.  The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling but in an extremely narrow manner-without addressing the rationale for discrimination under Proposition 8.  They did use some interesting language in the background referring back to previous laws against marriage which were struck down,

 

If tradition alone is insufficient to justify maintaining a prohibition with a discriminatory effect, then it is necessarily insufficient to justify changing the law to revert to a previous state. A preference for the way things were before same-sex couples were allowed to marry, without any identifiable good that a return to the past would produce, amounts to an impermissible preference against same-sex couples themselves, as well as their families.[2]

 

 

       The Court of Appeals was referring to the last time the Supreme Court looked at a comparably important and discriminatory law against marriage- almost 46 years ago in Loving v. Virginia.  In the Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.1 (1967)., the Supreme Court struck down Virginia's anti-miscegenation law which prohibited inter-racial marriage for the sake of protecting racial purity and preserving segregation.  The trial judge in the Loving case had a simple rationale that invoked God,

 

Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.

 

 

       Whether discrimination based on sexual orientation is on a par with discrimination based on race is deeply contested among the American people.  In an extraordinary move, the United States Justice Department has taken a stand in this question and this case, by filing an amicus brief with the Court on February 28, 2013.[3]  

            I have heard both proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage cite the decidedly higher authority, as in Loving.  For example, Cardinal Dolan and many others, who oppose legalizing same-sex marriage cite the unquestionable authority,

 

"Our country's founding principles speak of rights given by God, not invented by government, and certain noble values - life, home, family, marriage, children, faith - that are protected, not re-defined, by a state presuming omnipotence.

 

Please, not here!  We cherish true freedom, not as the license to do whatever we want, but the liberty to do what we ought; we acknowledge that not every desire, urge, want, or chic cause is automatically a "right."  And, what about other rights, like that of a child to be raised in a family with a mom and a dad?

 

Our beliefs should not be viewed as discrimination against homosexual people.  The Church affirms the basic human rights of gay men and women, and the state has rightly changed many laws to offer these men and women hospital visitation rights, bereavement leave, death benefits, insurance benefits, and the like.  This is not about denying rights. It is about upholding a truth about the human condition.  Marriage is not simply a mechanism for delivering benefits:  It is the union of a man and a woman in a loving, permanent, life-giving union to pro-create children.  Please don't vote to change that.  If you do, you are claiming the power to change what is not into what is, simply because you say so.  This is false, it is wrong, and it defies logic and common sense.

 

Yes, I admit, I come at this as a believer, who, along with other citizens of a diversity of creeds believe that God, not Albany, has settled the definition of marriage a long time ago."[4]

 

 

       There are legal weaknesses with Cardinal Dolan's position, or any religious one for that matter- the principal one being that the Church's position on marriage lacks relevance on the laws of the United States or its Constitution.  The Courts and the Legislature are sovereign from the theological realm because America is not like Iran, or other countries, a theocracy. 

       When political groups speak of religion and the Christian roots of America as evidenced by reference to God in the Declaration of Independence for example, they tend almost never to also refer to the suspicion of any established religion by the state that was so deeply held by the Founding Fathers.  For example, the historical and cultural anti-Catholicism of many of the Founding Fathers, whether carried over from the Church of England or not, was profound and pervasive.  Yet what was agreed ab initio about America was that it must never be allowed to be a theocracy where anyone's religious freedom would be curtailed by the joining of the state and a church.

       Speaking of looking back, an interesting exchange took place between the Court's originalist jurist, Justice Antonin Scalia and the former Republican Solicitor General Ted Olsen,


Scalia: "When did it become unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from marriage?"   "1791? 1868, when the 14th Amendment was adopted?"

Olsen: "When did it become unconstitutional to prohibit interracial marriage?" Olson asked. "When did it become unconstitutional to assign children to separate schools?"  [Referring to Loving v. Virginia and Brown v. Board of Education].

Scalia: "At the time that the equal protection clause was adopted," he said, before adding, "but don't give me a question to my question."

Olsen: "You've never required that before."

 

Advantage Ted Olsen.

       From an historical perspective, marriage has been a secular institution; longer than it has been a religious one-with state recognition of marriage going back to Roman times and in other parts of the world preceding the Roman Empire.  The early church in Roman times did not have a marriage rite.  In fact in much of the ancient world, marriage was to secure social and political alliances and for economic purposes as much as for procreation.  In England, until 1753 and the Marriage Act of Lord Hardwicke became law, the Church of England permitted what we would consider very irregular marriages (where one of the parties was a child, one of the parties was already married, or the parents did not know) so long as they were performed by an ordained clergyman of the Church of England.  Your idea of "traditional marriage" may depend quite a bit on the length of your historical memory.

       The Supreme Court hears oral arguments on DOMA latter this morning.  Stay tuned for what may be the most interesting and important ruling of the high court in a very long time.@

R. Tamara de Silva



[2] Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012)

[4] http://blog.archny.org/index.php/the-true-meaning-of-marriage/

Oligarchy and Its Discontents-What Money Buys

August 20, 2012

Oligarchy and Its Discontents-What Money Buys

By R Tamara de Silva

August 20, 2012

 

            "The optimist thinks this is the best of all possible worlds. The      pessimist fears it is true."

                                                J. Robert Oppenheimer

 

 

       Last week it was announced that the United States Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission would not seek any criminal charges against Goldman Sachs or for that matter the executives of MF Global including its CEO, former United States Senator Jon Corzine.  This likely surprised many people who still read the news, but actually infuriated no more than three people among them... and they were probably on the verge of becoming unhinged anyway.  Most people realize that while economists look for optimized states whose existence is perfectly beyond dispute within their own models...optimized models of the actual economy and democracy for that matter, exist only in the Great Books... and many other books.  In point of fact, the discontents of oligarchy are numerous.  While economists may not spend much time successfully modeling the real world-perhaps in part because there are no repercussions for their being in error, catastrophic events happen in the real world and are not modeled or anticipated by any economist.   Recent events like the decision to give Jon Corzine and MF Global a pass are legitimate examples of the role of money in politics and in the law. 

       Henry Adams sort of foresaw the events of last week.  Henry Adams had a privileged perch from which to view the dilemmas of American democracy as he was the great grandson of the second American President John Adams and grandson of our sixth President, John Quincy Adams.  There are certain scathing critiques of politics that have always attracted me to Henry Adams-in the same way I was drawn as child to the diatribes of Cato the Elder.  For example, he regularly wrote about the mortal danger to American democracy manifested by the role of money, especially corporate influence and how its tendency to corrupt the political system, would be the country's ultimate undoing.  In writing about the corruption of the Erie Railroad for the Westminster Review in 1870, he described corporate influence growing to the point of being unchecked,

 

          "swaying power such as has never in the world's history been trusted in the hands of mere private citizens,...after having created a system of quiet but irresistible corruption-will ultimately succeed in directing government itself. Under the American form of society, there is now no authority capable of effective resistance."

 

       He was also disturbed by the party system of politics in America and saw it to be willing to sacrifice principle for accommodation.   This theme comes out in his book, Democracy.  In Democracy the idealistic and hyper-principled heroine, Madeleine Lee is courted by the far more practical and ambitious Senator Silas P. Ratcliffe.  Madeleine decides not to marry Ratcliffe though it seems that he gets the better of her in almost all their arguments about politics.  Ratcliffe has aspirations to the White House and argues that moral authority comes from his political party the party with which he will on principle never disagree, "that great results can only be accomplished by great parties, I have uniformly yielded my own personal opinions where they have failed to obtain general assent."  

       Many of the books exchanges between Madeleine and Ratcliffe find Madeleine losing the argument.  She prefers to remain single and reject Ratcliffe and Washington at the end of the novel as she is determined to return to her philanthropic works saying, "The bitterest part of this horrid story...is that nine out of ten of our countrymen would say I had made a mistake."  And they still would.   I confess I see myself in Madeleine but one who must stay, without leaving, just out of an insatiable curiosity to observe all that will happen.

 

Citizens United v. FEC and the Judiciary

       Money has always played a role in politics.  Any discussion of the role of money in politics, judicial elections or law enforcement in 2012 has to consider the United States Supreme Court's January 2010 decision in Citizens United v Federal Election Commission in which the Court ruled that political spending is a form of protected speech under the First Amendment.  Citizens United allows corporations and unions to spend money to support or denounce candidates in elections through ads.  This is a titan of a case, perhaps unrivalled in its potential to alter the face of representative government in the United States because of the way that most people who vote decide on a candidate-they watch or listen to broadcast media advertisements.   However, Citizens United did not alter much of the McCain-Feingold campaign law, which still regulates corporate donations to political parties and candidates.  Nor does the case affect political action committees or PACs, which can contribute directly to candidates.

       Perhaps the greatest impact of the Citizens United decision will be in the election of state judges.  Judicial independence at one time meant independence from the Crown.  Since then the term judicial independence has come to mean the expectation (however well grounded or not) that when dealing with the justice system, a person can expect a member of the judiciary free from the appearance of personal, monetary or political bias in the outcome of the case.  This mirrors the all important principle stated in Article 40 of the Magna Carta, "To no one will we sell, to one will we refuse or delay right of justice."    

       More money spent on judicial elections, it is feared, will give rise to the impression that justice is for sale very much reminiscent of John Grisham's book, "The Appeal," wherein a billionaire CEO buys himself a state supreme court justice who rules in favor of his company on an appeal.  Grisham's book is eerily like the true story of Supreme Court of West Virginia Justice Brent Benjamin who ruled in favor of the $3,000,000 campaign donor, Don Blankenship, the CEO of A.T. Massey Coal in a case involving a $50,000,000 verdict.  The United States Supreme Court ruled that Justice Benjamin ought to have recused himself in the case Caperton v. Massey.

       There is however one place where Citizens United may have a salutary effect on the judicial system.  In Chicago's Cook County, Illinois the slating of judges is militantly political and based not on merit per se but on a candidate's payment of $25,000 to one of the members of the Judicial Slating Committee of the Cook County Democratic Party.  Judges that are slated, almost invariably win.  Citizens United cannot but have a salutary effect here because it is difficult to imagine a worse system for picking judges anywhere.

 

The Imperial Presidency and Money

       James Madison was a staunch advocate for the separation of powers between all three branches of government.  The authors of a recent book, "The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic," by sitting Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner and an Adrian Vermeule from Harvard Law argue that the separation of powers is a relic of the past and largely beside the point.  Without getting into questions of judicial activism and the phenomenon of hyper-opinionated sitting justices, they are actually right from an anthropological perspective.   They are right in so far that the Executive Branch has become, with the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act and sweeping acts of legislation such as Dodd-Frank and now the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the most powerful branch of government.  The Executive has created so many branches, departments and agencies under its purview, most with rule-making ability-that its power has become tantamount to that of an imperial monarchy.

       However, Justice Posner because he seems only to view the world through the lense of a relentlessly pragmatic cost-benefit, economic analysis, draws at times predictable but disturbingly simplistic conclusions.   In their book, Justice Posner and Dr. Vermeule acknowledge the relative impotence of the other branches to keep up with or check the Executive and go on to assert that this does not much matter because Presidents are checked by elections, "liberal legalism's essential failing is that it overestimates the need for the separation of powers and even the rule of law."  

       In other words, just because Presidents are above the law, it does not matter because they will be checked by the rule of politics-they will be voted out.  This is startling simplistic and weak logic because it assumes an efficient marketplace, with equal participants and perfectly symmetrical information.  It also allows for the interpretation of the Constitution based upon a pragmatic economic analysis completely at  war with the absolute first principles and "inalienable rights" held sacred by the Founding Fathers and all the state legislators that ratified the Constitution. 

            This is also where money comes in.

       In his run for President in 2008, President Obama spend over $730 million and is expected by Reuters to raise $1 billion for 2012.  Spending for the 2012 election for all parties and candidates could, according to one estimate, top $9.8 billion in large part because of spending by super PACs.   Yet almost 25% of super PAC money comes from just five donors, Harold Simmons (pro-Romney) , Sheldon Adelson (pro-Romney), Peter Theil (pro-Ron Paul), Bob Perry (pro-Romney now) and Jeffrey Katzenberg (pro-Obama).[1]

       If money affects voting and elections, then according to Posner's logic, the people who will actually exercise the rule of politics and check the Executive Branch are to be these handful of businessmen and others like them.   According to the Center for Responsive Data, 3.7% of the contributors to super PACs account for 80% of the money raised-46 donors have given in excess of $67,000,000.[2]

 

Money and Prosecutions

       In the case of MF Global and Jon Corzine, Jon Corzine has been one of President Obama's elite bundlers in 2011 and 2012.  He campaigned heavily for President Obama when he was governor of New Jersey and has held private fundraisers for President Obama in his home even after MF Global went bankrupt and $1.6 billion of customer funds went missing in October 2011.  It was announced last week that he is unlikely to face any criminal charges.

       Contrast this to the Department of Justice's handling of the same violation of the Federal rule requiring the segregation of customer funds in the matter of Peregrine Financial Group.  $215 million of customer funds were discovered to be missing from customer segregated accounts in July 2012 at Peregrine Financial Group.  Russell Wasendorf Sr was arrested and criminally charged later that month.   Same act-missing customer funds-but far disparate prosecution. 

       Remember that in the futures industry, the key difference between futures commissions merchants ("FCMs") like Peregrine and MF Global and securities brokerages is that FCMs, unlike securities brokers, are required by law to keep their customer funds segregated from the FCM's own funds.   It is in this way that FCMs have been able, with comparatively few exceptions, to ensure that customer deposits are completely protected from all losses an FCM may incur due to its own proprietary trading.   Before MF Global, the requirement that FCMs segregate customer funds completely from their own funds largely prevented FCM customers from losing money due to an FCM bankruptcy

       In my first article on MF Global, I suggested that the $1.2 billion missing from customer segregated funds may have been incurred due to over-leveraged positions in European sovereign debt that coincidentally took a dramatic turn for the worse (as they did in fact as yield curves doubled rapidly in some issues) during the last weeks of October, and that funds were transferred to cover margin in customer funds held in European debt.   There is a scenario that nothing illegal would have occurred because CFTC Rule 1.25 had been amended to permit the investment of customer segregated funds in foreign sovereign debt.  Keep in mind that this rule was amended by Jon Corzine's lobbying of Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") Chairman Gary Gensler, who is a friend and colleague of Jon Corzine.

        An alternate illegal scenario is that MF Global may have engaged in some late stage embezzlement of customer funds that were supposed to be segregated from MF Global's accounts and never commingled with any other funds.[3] One way this may have occurred is if the funds were transferred out of customer segregated funds for a legal purpose but without the customers' meaningful consent or, more likely, with an intent to deceive the customer.  

       If MF Global transferred customer funds out of segregated accounts as a loan to MF Global to cover margin calls in existing positions in sovereign debt, (perfectly legal)[4], it may however, be fraud and intent to deceive on its part if MF Global knew it could not repay the money.  This fraud may have occurred if MF Global knew (and it would be interesting to argue how it did not) that it sought to legally borrow from customer funds, knowing that it was de facto insolvent and could not replace the money.   

       During Senate and House hearings on MF Global, Terrance Duffy, the CEO of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange contradicted Corzine's testimony and stated that the CME's investigation of the MF Global matter revealed the existence of emails between MF Global's assistant treasurer and Jon Corzine.  These emails where contrary to what Corzine told Congress and suggested that Corzine had in fact authorized the transfer of customer funds out of customer accounts-the funds that went missing.   We also know that while Jon Corzine claimed he knew nothing about the financials at MF Global, he was peddling them to Interactive Brokers as he was trying to broker a last minute sale of MF Global to Interactive Brokers--in other words, he had to have been extremely familiar with MF Global's financials during the exact time period he claims to Congress to know nothing of what was happening.

       We still do not know everything that really happened at MF Global because the Department of Justice has not yet decided to grant any immunity to the one person who would be their chief witness in the matter, the Assistant Treasurer.  The Assistant Treasurer is represented by Reid H. Weingarten, who is as luck would have it, is one of United States Attorney General Eric Holder's best friends.   Some could say they agreed to let the clock run out on this one. 

       From a purely economic cost benefit analysis, Jon Corzine's raising in excess of $500,000 for President Obama in 2012 alone was the smartest money he ever spent and appears to have bought him justice in the sense of a reprieve from the CEO of Peregrine's fate.

      What about Mr. Adelson?  The billionaire casino magnate is being investigated for possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, money-laundering and bribery.  Perhaps contributing by some accounts close to $100 million towards Mr. Romney's election would ensure a stop to the pesky Federal investigators.  If so, this would be money entirely worth spending.

       This brings us to the last bit of news from last week that Goldman Sachs would not be investigated for criminal wrong-doing in connection with mortgage crisis and certain deals like ABACUS. 

       This Justice Department  and SEC have gotten many investment banks to execute settlement agreements with them including Goldman and Citigroup-essentially selling "get out of jail cards." Are these settlement agreements, as the Judge Rakoff and Bloomberg's Jonathan Weil have asked, merely considered the "cost of doing business" or some part of a transaction tax on offending financial titans?[5]   

       If it were in the public's interest to prevent fraud upon the market, then fines should be significant enough to actually deter illegal conduct.  If not, prosecutions should be endured and convictions gotten.    The historic role of punishment in the criminal justice system has not been just punishment, but deterrence.  Having Citigroup or GS pay $285 million is pin money to banks with quarterly revenue in the billions of dollars-the "cost of doing business" is not a deterrent to anyone but more like the cost of a municipal parking sticker to the average Joe.

       What is problematic about bank settlements is that smaller market participants cannot afford to pay for "get out of jail cards" and because the costs of prosecuting anyone other than an investment bank are less, smaller participants are actually prosecuted and do get jail time.   Peter Boyer and Government Accountability President Peter Schweizer have written about how justice is for sale in Mr. Eric Holder's Department of Justice pointing to the fact that despite President Obama's claims to represent the 99%, Department of Justice "criminal prosecutions are at 20 year lows for corporate securities and bank fraud." [6]  Given the correlation between campaign contributions (admittedly protected speech) and selective prosecutions, the 20 year low in bank fraud prosecutions is unlikely to change  with either political party.

       Consider the money.  Goldman Sachs employees were the second largest single contributor to President Obama in 2008 contributing $1,013,091.[7]   Goldman's employees are the largest single contributor to Mr. Romney in the 2012 election cycle having donated $636,080 by the end of the last quarter.[8]   Goldman Sachs is also one of the largest clients of Mr. Eric Holder's lawyer firm Covington & Burling.

       Money has always played a part in politics and it is rational for everyone with a stake in the political process to participate.  But not all participation is equal-not even close.  The odds of one vote ever making a difference in a Presidential election are between 1 in 10 million and 1 in 100 million-depending upon the state in which you live.  Voting only matters in the aggregate but money seems to matter more in terms of affecting action after election.    Above all, justice must never be for sale because as Cato the Elder and many others have pointed out throughout history the selling of justice, like the selling of indulgences, is an attribute of a decaying and dying political system.

       What is disconcerting is that mere principles, be they the adherence to ideas like freedom and individual liberty or the idea that you are secure in the sanctity of your own home, are always bound to be under-represented in the electoral process and as such destined to play the underdogs.   At one point in Democracy, Madeleine asks the impressive Ratcliffe, "Surely...something can be done to check corruption.  Are we for ever to be at the mercy of thieves and ruffians?  Is respectable government impossible in democracy?"  Ratcliffe's reply is haunting, "No representative government...can long be much better or much worse than the society it represents.  Purify society and you purify the government.  But try to purify the government artificially and you only aggravate failure. @

R. Tamara de Silva

Chicago, Illinois

August 20, 2012

 

R. Tamara de Silva is a securities lawyer and independent trader

 



[4] Remember CFTC Rule 1.25 which had been amended to allow the investment of customer segregated funds in foreign sovereign debt, was amended back after the fall of MF Global to disallow the investment of customer segregated funds in foreign sovereign debt.

[5] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-02/citigroup-finds-obeying-the-law-is-too-darn-hard-jonathan-weil.html


[6]  http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2012/05/07/justice-for-sale-holder

The Supreme Court's Healthcare Ruling

June 28, 2012
The Supreme Court's Healthcare Ruling and the Making of a New Tax


By R. Tamara de Silva

June 28, 2012

Today a divided Supreme Court held that the individual mandate within the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") is Constitutional (567 U. S. ____ (2012))[1] . The 193 page opinion contains an excellent discourse on the Commerce Clause, state rights, un-enumerated rights and what are supposed to be the limits of the Federal government's power, making the jist of the ruling all the more extraordinary, if not ironic. The decision is remarkable because it is the first time in our history that it has been held that the United States Constitution permits a financial penalty for non-performance of an economic act to be treated as a tax. According to Chief Justice John G. Roberts, "The Affordable Care Act's requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably by characterized as a tax...Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness." As of this writing I cannot think of another example where the non-performance of an act results in the levying of a Federal tax. Federal tax is generally levied on such things as income, investment income and the consumption of certain goods like alcohol, gasoline guzzling cars, telephones, duck stamps, et. al.

In writing about President Obama's healthcare law earlier in the year, I pointed out that the Supreme Court would rule upon the Constitutionality of the ACA based upon three criteria, the Commerce Clause, the Taxing Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clauses within the United States Constitution.[2] Like most others, I dismissed the possibility that the Supreme Court would utilize the Taxing Clause to uphold the individual mandate of the ACA because the mandate is a penalty or punishment rather than a tax, and the purpose of taxes has historically always been to raise revenue - not to be punitive. Apparently I was completely in error.

Commerce Clause Preserved

The Supreme Court's decision was always to be of monumental importance to either keeping the Government's powers under the Commerce Clause checked, or allowing them to be let upon the nation, unfettered, limitless and absolute. The Supreme Court correctly stated that were the ACA to be upheld under the Commerce Clause it, "would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority." The Framers knew the difference between regulating commerce and using the power of the Commerce Clause to coerce commerce and every act that may in the aggregate of all people performing it, have any impact on commerce. Had the Supreme Court upheld the ACA under the Commerce Clause, Congress would be able to regulate absolutely everything in America under its ability to regulate commerce.

Chief Justice John Marshall wrote almost two hundred years ago in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), that Congress' power under the Commerce Clause is the power, "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution." [3] Congress has long had the power to regulate insurance and as such and to some degree, health insurance. [4] Chief Justice Roberts rejected the Government's argument for the individual mandate based on congressional use of the Commerce Clause because he stated that Congress had a power to regulate commerce not to create it. In all five Justices rejected the argument that the individual mandate of the ACA would pass Constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito.

The ACA was meant to help the over 50 million or so Americans without health-care coverage, and to ensure that those with health insurance coverage do not lose it. Much of the most politically broad based support for healthcare reform is based on legitimate concerns over runaway health-care costs. Many opponents of the ACA, while acknowledging problems with the current health care system have suggested alternatives to a national health care plan but their solutions place them squared against two of the most powerful lobbied interests in Washington, insurance companies and tort lawyers. Advocates for private sector solutions like opening up the health care market to allow individuals to purchase insurance across state lines and to select only the type of coverage they need, argue that these two solutions alone would automatically make health care more affordable to a majority of Americans by driving insurance premiums down. It is difficult to argue that medical tort reform, curtailing frivolous medical malpractice suits, and the curbing of medical drug class action suits (plaintiffs for which are shamelessly solicited on every channel during every day of prime time television) would not help the entire medical industry-though who will take on the tort bar?

Those who do not have health insurance and use the emergency room or public hospitals when sick (what are called "cost-shifters") shift an immense economic cost on those who have health insurance and the insurance industry as a whole. Ironically what today's Supreme Court ruling does not address, because it is not addressed in the ACA, is that fact that the largest cost-shifters, illegal aliens (who account of $8.1 billion in health care costs) and low-income persons (who are already covered by Medicaid, at the cost of $15 billion per annum) will be exempt from the mandated health care regime of ACA. The most important feature in the over 2,700 page ACA is its individual mandate because this was always intended to shift some of the costs of health care to the healthy and the voluntarily uninsured -requiring that these groups, and ironically not the costliest cost-shifters, purchase private insurance.

Mandate as a Tax But Not a Penalty?

The purpose of taxation is to raise revenue. The purpose of penalties is to punish and deter unwanted behavior-sometimes, as in the case of the individual mandate, with the promise of criminal prosecution. The two have historically been distinct though with some overlap. For example, there are legal penalties for speeding (below what rises to the charge of reckless driving), streaking, violating the copyright laws or removing stickers from mattresses. Some of these penalties carry fines but the purpose of these fines is not to raise revenue so much as it is to deter conduct. In essence, no where even in the labyrinth of the IRS Code are streaking or removing mattress labels "taxable events."

Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan and Sotomayor agreed with the Government's argument that the individual mandate within the ACA constitutes a tax on people who do not buy health insurance and is permissive under Congress' taxing power. Here is where the logic of Justice Roberts' opinion gets tougher to follow.

How can the individual mandate, which imposes a financial penalty upon anyone who does not purchase health insurance after 2014, and is not exempt from doing so, be called anything other than a penalty? Chief Justice Roberts states that what the mandate is called (Congressional Democrats and the White House have referred to the mandate as a penalty and not a tax-ACA itself refers to the mandate as a penalty) is not determinative of what it is. His opinion states that the individual mandate is distinguishable from a penalty because, "the mandate is not a legal command to buy insurance,"-it is a requirement that people who do not purchase insurance pay the IRS a fine. If this seems like a distinction without a discernable difference-you would not be alone in thinking so. Chief Justice Roberts argues that the failure of an individual to purchase health insurance would not, while subjecting that person to an IRS fine, be unlawful. If this is true, I do not advise passing this along as a defense if the fine is not paid...

Congress may have stumbled upon a new way to mandate every type of behavior the Court correctly forewarned against it using the Commerce Clause to mandate, by use of the Taxing Clause. Losing the distinction between penalties and taxes may prove a slippery and dangerous slope-one that institutionally empowers the lawmaker and makes mincemeat of the ability of the hapless individual to any longer avoid doing any number of things-such as not purchasing any number of items that she simply does not want. Thinking through the potential abuses for Court's reasoning in this instance is disturbing. There is more to the Court's opinion deserving of analysis but the use of the Taxing Clause to uphold the ACA's individual mandate, is a legal and historical first.

Ultimately, like so many things that happen in American life and political discourse, the jury of public opinion will come down on the Court's decision as it does on so much else-along deepening political battle lines between current iterations of liberalism and progressivism. Not everything must be about politics but perhaps it must when the country seems deeply divided within itself about the role of its government. Divided between those who want the government merely to assure equal opportunity to all and those who seek a far more idealized realization of fairness, and even a greater equality of outcomes. What we are lacking is a jury fixed merely on preserving the freedoms and institutions of the Constitution.@

R. Tamara de Silva

June 28, 2012
Chicago, Illinois

R. Tamara de Silva is an independent trader and lawyer

Footnotes:
1. http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11-393c3a2.pdf
2. http://www.timelyobjections.com/2012/03/difficult-legal-issues-in-the-healthcare-case-before-the-supreme-court.html
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). at pp. 196
4. Think of ERISA, CORBRA, HIPAA, et. al.

Federal Judge in Health Care Case Orders Executive Branch to Explain Speech

April 4, 2012

Federal Judge in Health Care Case Orders Executive Branch to Explain Speech

By R Tamara de Silva
April 4, 2012


It not typical in the course of oral arguments for a Federal Judge to assign the Department of Justice and the Attorney General a homework assignment. Yesterday, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard oral arguments involving the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA" or "Obamacare") when something extraordinary happened. The Court was hearing oral arguments on an appeal by the Physicians Hospitals of America and Texas Spine & Joint Hospital, Lts, for the dismissal of an action they had filed for declaratory and injunctive relief against Kathleen Sebelius, as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services to prevent enforcement of Section 6001 of the ACA. During the Appellee's arguments, Judge Jerry Smith, interrupted the Department of Justice's lawyer, Dana Lydia Kaersvang to ask her whether the Department of Justice, an arm of the Executive Branch, agreed with statements made by President Obama that seemed to indicate that the Executive Branch did not believe the Judicial Branch had the power to overturn laws it found violated the Constitution.

"Judge Smith: Does the Department of Justice recognize that federal courts have the authority in appropriate circumstances to strike federal statutes because of one or more constitutional infirmities?
Ms. Kaersvang: Yes, your honor. Of course, there would need to be a severability analysis, but yes.
Judge Smith: I'm referring to statements by the president in the past few days to the effect...that it is somehow inappropriate for what he termed "unelected" judges to strike acts of Congress that have enjoyed -- he was referring, of course, to Obamacare -- what he termed broad consensus in majorities in both houses of Congress.
That has troubled a number of people who have read it as somehow a challenge to the federal courts or to their authority or to the appropriateness of the concept of judicial review. And that's not a small matter. So I want to be sure that you're telling us that the attorney general and the Department of Justice do recognize the authority of the federal courts through unelected judges to strike acts of Congress or portions thereof in appropriate cases.
Ms. Kaersvang: Marbury v. Madison is the law, your honor, but it would not make sense in this circumstance to strike down this statute, because there's no...
Judge Smith: I would like to have from you by noon on Thursday...a letter stating what is the position of the attorney general and the Department of Justice, in regard to the recent statements by the president, stating specifically and in detail in reference to those statements what the authority is of the federal courts in this regard in terms of judicial review. That letter needs to be at least three pages single spaced, no less, and it needs to be specific. It needs to make specific reference to the president's statements and again to the position of the attorney general and the Department of Justice." [1]

On Monday President Obama stated that, "I am confident the Supreme Court will not take what would be an unprecedented, extraordinary step of overturning a law that was passed by a strong majority of a democratically elected Congress." The President's statement is false in that he discounts over two hundred years of the Federal Court exercising its power of judicial review to do just that.

The Judicial Branch's power of judicial review arises out of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), wherein Chief Justice John Marshall established the United States Supreme Court's power of judicial review. In this case, Justice Marshall pointed out that the Constitution is "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation" and that "an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void."[2] The Constitution is the nation's highest law and when an act of Congress conflicts with it, that act is to be held invalid.

To be fair, the words of the President, keeping in mind he is the head of the Executive Branch, attacking the power of a co-equal branch of government, in this instance the Judicial Branch, are not unprecedented nor constrained to one political party. President George W. Bush criticized "unelected judges" and their power to go against the will of the people. Both conservatives and liberals reliably point to the hand of judicial activism when things do not go their way. Some so-called Supreme Court experts go so far as to assert that a Supreme Court justice will ever only view any given issue of law through either a Democratic or Republican prism-ruling out any allegiance or oath to the Constitution or the complexity of Constitutional law-of course to many of these experts, there is no complexity to the law or other matters, other than what falls between bold ideological demarcations.

Perhaps the most famous Supreme Court skeptic was President Franklin D. Roosevelt. President Roosevelt displayed a contempt for the Supreme Court calling it the Court of "Nine Old Men" because in 1937, six of the justices were age 70 or more and the youngest one a mere 61. When the Supreme Court held the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 un-Constitutional, President Roosevelt famously complained that the plainly archaic court had applied "the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce." In order to remedy their apparent senility or his belief that they would only continue to strike down several parts of the New Deal, he came up with a plan in the form of a bill that would require all Supreme Court Justices to retire at 70 or have the President appoint a younger justice to serve alongside them.

Since Roosevelt, Presidential candidates from George Wallace to Newt Gingrich have run on platforms promising to rein in the Judiciary in the way they think appropriate.

Somehow, the Founding Fathers managed a design that would anticipate even the hyper-politicization of the present day. A powerful reason for the Constitution's establishment of three equal and separate branches of government was to ensure that each branch would serve as a check and balance on the others-in theory not permitting one to become too powerful. Unelected judges were intended to be removed from shifting political tides and ensure that political mobs and their demagogues would not overrun the basic protections of freedom guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The law of the land would not be held hostage to it's the shifting agendas of political parties or vain ideology. To anyone but an ideologue, the unelected nature of Supreme Court judges and the lifetime tenure of Federal Court judges are not bad things.

Judge Smith's asking the Department of Justice to clarify whether the words of its boss were those of the Attorney General and the posture of the Department of Justice is extraordinary. Many would argue that Congress, politicians of every stripe and Presidents violate a respect and regard for the other branch of the government by routinely criticizing the Judiciary and politicizing everything. All pretense of a kinder gentler discourse on matters of public policy may have gone the way of the Dodo to be replaced by discourse at the lowest common denominator. So perhaps Federal judges should be above the fray and not get sullied by stepping into political brawls. A counter-argument might be that if I make one legal argument to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals during oral arguments and the moment I walk outside the building contradict what I have just said by making another legal argument, the Court of Appeals would have a right to inquire what my position really is. Perhaps because President Obama is essentially a litigant in the appeal and his suggestion of judicial review being unprecedented, radical enough a legal posture, Judge Smith's query of the Department of Justice is reasonable.@
R. Tamara de Silva

April 4, 2012
Chicago, Illinois

R. Tamara de Silva is an independent trader and lawyer

Footnotes:
1. http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgumentRecordings.aspx?prid=257465
2. 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

Update- Department of Justice Responds to the Court:
April 5, 2012: Attorney General Eric Holder responds to Judge Jerry Smith-the full text of his letter is here: AG letter to 5th Circuit .pdf
Mr. Holder states that his letter should not be taken as a supplemental brief and does not concern the arguments before the Court but points to the presumptive Constitutionality of Federal statutes and quotes two Federal judges who did not find Obamacare to be violative of the Constitution.

Difficult Legal Issues in the Healthcare Case Before the Supreme Court

March 27, 2012
Difficult Legal Issues in the Healthcare Case Before the Supreme Court


By R Tamara de Silva
March 27, 2012

Arguments began yesterday before the United States Supreme Court on the future of President Obama's healthcare bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA" or "Obamacare"). The question of whether President Obama's national health care plan would withstand the Constitutional challenges brought by the Attorneys General in twenty-six states was destined to be determined by the Supreme Court when after August 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a 304 page opinion that the ACA would violate the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause. After the Eleventh Circuit's ruling there were two conflicting Circuit Court opinions on the law because the Sixth Circuit had upheld the ACA as not violative of the Constitution in June of 2011. The Supreme Court will decide upon the Constitutionality of the ACA based upon three criteria, the Commerce Clause, the Taxing Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clauses within the United States Constitution. None of the arguments are quite as clear cut, however as many people believe.

The Supreme Court's ultimate decision is of monumental importance to either keeping the Government's powers under the Commerce Clause checked, or allowing them to be let upon this nation, unbounded, limitless and absolute. The future of this decision will affect nothing less than whether Congress is ever again, held back from regulating absolutely everything in America under its ability to regulate commerce or what are called its Commerce powers.

In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), Chief Justice John Marshall established the United States Supreme Court's power of judicial review. In this case, Justice Marshall pointed out words that are still forceful today- that the Constitution was "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation" and that "an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void."[1] The Constitution is the nation's highest law and when an act of Congress conflicts with it, that act is to be held invalid. The Supreme Court examines President Obama's healthcare law under the authority of this old and venerable case.

Commerce Clause

Chief Justice John Marshall wrote almost two hundred years ago in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), that Congress' power under the Commerce Clause is the power, "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution."[2] Congress has long had the power to regulate insurance and as such, health insurance.[3]

Perhaps the most helpful discussion of the Commerce Clause arguments is within the Eleventh Circuit case. In that case, twenty-six states sued the Government for using the Commerce Clause to have Congress require by law that Americans must buy health insurance from "birth to death" from a private company or pay a penalty-in effect legislate that every American buy a product from a private vendor whether they want it or not.

The Government has argued that those who do not have health insurance and use the emergency room or public hospitals when sick (what are called "cost-shifters" in the court opinion) affect interstate commerce and fall within the ambit of the Commerce Clause because they shift an economic cost on those who have health insurance and the insurance industry as a whole.[4]

President Obama's defense before the Eleventh Circuit asserts that by merely breathing, individuals affect interstate commerce, "and therefore Congress may regulate them at every point of their life." This argument would seek to expand Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause beyond current law and give the Federal Government absolute unfettered power to regulate any activity that had but the most tenuous connection to interstate commerce.

There are two questions the Supreme Court must decide: 1) whether the decision not to purchase health insurance is an economic one; and 2) whether not purchasing health insurance is an activity or an inactivity. These questions are important in deciding whether the decision not to purchase health insurance is an economic decision. Some would consider that my decision not to buy health insurance is an act of economic inactivity-not an activity at all. The proponents of the ACA would differ and argue that the decision to not purchase health insurance is an economic decision to self-insure and discount the future risks of ill health. In other words, is an inactivity (not buying insurance) tantamount to an activity (buying health insurance) for purposes of the Commerce Clause? Are the two the same if when measured in the aggregate, they have a substantial enough impact on economic activity? The strongest defense of the ACA would be the argument that for the purposes of the Commerce Clause, there is no distinction between activity and inactivity. The decision not to buy health insurance (an inactivity) is arguably an economic decision for purposes of the Commerce Clause if when you take the aggregate of all people that make this economic decision, there is a substantial effect on inter-state commerce.

However, Eleventh Circuit Justices Joel Dubina and Frank Hull questioned whether the Commerce Clause subjects those outside of the stream of commerce to Congress' authority over commerce. People that do not buy health insurance are, "not making a voluntary decision to enter the stream of commerce, but this choice is being imposed on them by the Federal Government." [5]

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals points out the instances of when Congress has actually mandated personal action on United States citizens solely because they are American are relatively few: serving on juries, registering for the draft, filing tax returns and responding to the census. Before the ACA, Congress has not been able to compel Americans to engage in an activity, even one with substantial economic consequences-for example, no one is required by law to purchase flood insurance even if they live in a flood plain or for that matter stop building homes in flood plains. Congress has not yet required that people abandon New Orleans, nor hurricane prone areas or other geographic areas proven to attract recurring and costly natural disasters.

There is absolutely no precedent for Congress using the Commerce Clause to enforce a purely economic mandate. All previous government mandates of individual behavior that have an economic consequence primarily affect an American's responsibilities as a citizen with the United States. The government's mandate of a draft, filing a tax return and serving on a jury, all affect a citizen's interaction with the government itself and affect how government defends itself and operates. However, mandated health care would affect and mandate that every citizen interact with a private company-a requirement never before asked by the Government under the Commerce Clause.

President Obama's lawyers will make the argument in favor of mandating that an individual purchase a good or service just because the decision not to purchase a good or service, if taken in the aggregate of all person who similarly made this decision, have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. However, the Eleventh Circuit cited Lopez v. United States, which held that the a Congressional finding of the aggregate effect of economic activity was not sufficient to hold legislation a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause, "Simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so."[6]

Proponents of the ACA would point to the very same the Lopez case which hold that Congress can regulate intrastate "economic activity" when that activity, "viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects" commerce between borders.[7]

Were the Supreme Court to find the Administration's arguments persuasive, their reasoning would mean that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to mandate every conceivable economic decision, even decision lacking what the courts have historically required, "a nexus" or connection or a regulated economic activity. Even areas that have historically been under the jurisdiction of the states such as marriage, divorce, child custody, choice of education and all have substantial economic effects in the aggregate and would theoretically be candidates for regulation under the Commerce Clause. Health care has historically been regulated by the states.

If the Government can mandate the purchase of private health insurance, it can mandate every other private purchase. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion points out the Constitutionally untenable nature of the defendants' position,

"In sum, the individual mandate is breathtaking in its expansive scope. It regulates those who have not entered the health care market at all. It regulates those who have entered the health care market, but have not entered the insurance market (and have no intention of doing so). It is overinclusive in when it regulates: it conflates those who presently consume health care with those who will not consume health care for many years into the future. The government's position amounts to an argument that the mere fact of an individual's existence substantially affects interstate commerce, and therefore Congress may regulate them at every point of their life. This theory affords no limiting principles in which to confine Congress's enumerated powers."
[8]


Consider the case of a famous Molotov cocktail in which it was held that Congress' power under the Commerce Clause did not extend to holding the arson of a private residence a Federal crime. In 1998, in Fort Wayne, Indiana, a certain Dewey Jones from Detroit decided the best way to dispose of a Molotov cocktail was to throw it into his cousin, James Walker, Jr's house. Predictably, Jones was convicted in U.S. District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. section 844(i), which holds that it is Federal crime to "maliciously damage or destroy, ...by means of fire or an explosive, any building... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." Jones' lawyers unsuccessfully argued that section 844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, agreed. The Court ruled that an owner-occupied private residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity, such that arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under section 844(i). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[w]ere we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of section 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain." [9]

What is most interesting about the Jones case is that in it the Supreme Court Justices asked the Government's lawyer what if anything he thought would not be included in the Government's suggested reading of the Commerce Clause--he could not seem to come up with limitation.

Taxing Clause

Proponents of the ACA will argue that the Congressional mandate of the ACA was a tax under the Taxing and Spending Clause. The Eleventh Circuit Court declined to see it thus pointing out how many times, Congress describes the mandate not as a tax but as a penalty and in its legislative history makes clear the ACA was intended as a penalty and not exclusively a revenue-raising mechanism. This is arguably the weakest defense of the ACA because only one court has even considered this a valid defense and bipartisan judges who have upheld the Constitutionality of the ACA have not found the Taxing Clause defense of the ACA persuasive.

Necessary and Proper Clause

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power, "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" it's other Federal powers. This language is the basis of the Necessary and Proper Clause and in my opinion, perhaps what may constitute the strongest defense of the ACA. One of the reasons being is the Necessary and Proper Clause is simply not perfectly clear what powers are given to the Federal Government and not the states to effectuate Federal laws and the powers of the Legislative and Executive Branches. Also, it is the Commerce Clause that has been invoked far more than the Necessary and Proper Clause, giving all a clearer sense of the latter's meaning.

Looking at original intent for hints on its intended scope is not exactly helpful either as it was the subject of heated debate between Alexander Hamilton, who believed it to authorize many implied and un-enumerated powers and Thomas Jefferson, who believed that necessary meant actually "necessary." The problem with Hamilton's meaning is that it would seem to justify so many recent laws and executive orders many in this country would argue are neither necessary or Constitutional. Necessary is in the eye of the beholder and would be capable of being used indiscriminately. What is more, the Necessary and Proper Clause can be invoked on matters that do not have an economic effect.

The most famous case fleshing out the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause was McCulloch v. Maryland, in which the Supreme Court ruled that,

The Government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action, and its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land. There is nothing in the Constitution which excludes incidental or implied powers. If the end be legitimate, and within the scope of the Constitution, all the means which are appropriate and plainly adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited, may be employed to carry it into effect pursuant to the Necessary and Proper clause.
[10]

Justice Scalia has suggested in Gonzales v. Raich that the question of whether an intrastate activity has a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce could alternatively be seen as a matter under the Necessary and Proper Clause. [11]

In Raich, the Supreme Court upheld the use of the Controlled Substances Act (a Federal law) to regulate and interfere with the wholly intrastate production of locally grown, medical marijuana as a valid exercise of the Government's powers under the Commerce Clause and the "cumulative effect" of intrastate activity. Intrastate activity could be regulated if it were to touch on a broader Federal regulatory framework affecting interstate commerce. The Supreme Court's decision in Raich may herald a judicial approval in the present healthcare case of the Federal Government's regulation of purely instrastate activity. Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion set the stage for prospectively using the Necessary and Proper Clause to allow the Federal Government to regulate intrastate activity that would affect a larger system of regulation of interstate commerce through the Commerce Clause.[12]


Complexity of Implications

The Constitution creates a limited federal government with powers that are not enumerated belonging to the people and the individual states. Yet every expanded use of the Government power through the mandate of Federal law, for the purposes of this writing, the Commerce Clause, is one less power to be held by the states or retained by the individual in determining how to live.

How to live has been a fundamental question posed by philosophers from the time of Plato and Aristotle and arguably earlier in ancient Buddhist texts. Today concerns about individual liberty are so often dismissed as the political diatribe of the libertarians or Ron Paul supporters. It is as if popular political discourse rendered in simple ideological terms has hijacked the need for meaningful analysis or discourse. What is lost is that every power surrendered to the Federal government through the Commerce Clause is one less that the individual states and the individual may retain in deciding how to live.

One of the grave implications of a Supreme Court decision upholding the ACA would be that if everything that affects interstate commerce (which, by the reasoning of President Obama's lawyers in defending the ACA, is every imaginable activity) then the states and the individual American are merely custodians or temporary repositories of power, powers, affecting every aspect of American life and powers that may be reclaimed by the Federal government at any time.

This would mean that there are few powers left exclusively to the states. The Federal government would discover its political reach, one power at a time.

The Commerce Clause simply states that Congress shall have power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." The Commerce Clause was intended to facilitate interstate commerce by allowing Congress to prevent states from passing discriminatory restrictions on the free-flow of interstate commerce.[13] To allow Congress to regulate all manner of activities far removed from that end, is to turn our system of a government of limited and enumerated powers on its head. Justice Marshall would find the ACA unconstitutional.

However, if the Supreme Court does not strike down the ACA as unconstitutional, and find the ACA to not violate the Commerce Clause, it would seem to be allowing for the very first time, Congress to use the Commerce Claus to mandate an activity on the part of an American and therefore open the flood gates to mandating any private action.@
R. Tamara de Silva

March 27, 2012 Chicago, Illinois

R. Tamara de Silva is an independent trader and lawyer

Footnotes:
1. 11. 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

2. Id. at pp. 196
3. Think of ERISA, CORBRA, HIPAA, et. al.
4. Interestingly, under the ACA, the largest cost-shifters-illegal aliens that account of $8.1 billion in health care costs and low-income persons that will be covered by an expansion of Medicaid (currently costing $15 billion in costs to health care system) will be exempt from the mandated health care regime of ACA. Shifting the purchasing mandate of the ACA to healthy and voluntarily uninsured individuals-requiring that this group and not the costliest cost-shifters purchase private insurance. See pp. 140 of Eleventh Circuit Opinion
5. Eleventh Circuit opinion at pp. 123
6. 514 U.S. at 557 n.2, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 n.2
7. Id. at 561
8. Eleventh Circuit Opinion at pp. 130-131
9. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000)
10. 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819)
11. "The regulation of an intrastate activity may be essential to a comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce even though the intrastate activity does not itself "substantially affect" interstate commerce. Moreover, as the passage from Lopez quoted above suggests, Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce." Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. !, 33-55 (2005) (Justice Scalia concurring)
12. Id.
13. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and see also, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)


Sackett v. EPA; Victory for Due Process and a Check on the Clean Water Act

March 21, 2012
Sackett v. EPA; Victory for Due Process and a Check on the Clean Water Act


By R Tamara de Silva
March 21, 2012

Today the United States Supreme Court ruled unanimously in Sackett v. EPA (10-1062)[1] that Chantall and Michael Sackett may bring a Federal civil action under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") to challenge the issuance of an EPA compliance order that had prevented them from building a home on their land. The importance of this ruling is that it constitutes a victory for due process for all Americans confronted by the EPA with crime.

Congress invents a new crime on average every week for every week of the year.[2] Departments of the Executive Branch have established regulations and rulings that further criminalize innocuous crime (what I mean here by innocuous is "crime" lacking the existence of any wrongful or criminal intent on the part of the alleged wrong-doer). These often esoteric regulations number in the hundreds of thousands. There are steep economic costs to all this rule making and quite often they are borne by ordinary Americans with limited resources-unable to fight a government with comparatively unlimited prosecutorial and administrative budgets. A case that illustrates this well is that of that of the Sacketts.

Keep in mind, the Federal government spends billions of dollars on prosecutions based upon theories of strict liability for obscure crimes honored more in their breach than by their rule often because the crimes lack definition. On example, which is at the heart of the Sacketts case is the Clean Water Act. The Clean Water Act prohibits, "the discharge of any pollutant by any person," without a permit, into the "navigable waters." The term "navigable waters" is defined in the Clean Water Act as, "the waters of the United States," ยง1362(7). The problem, identified by the Court in its ruling today, but has been obvious to so many of us for decades is that no where is the meaning of "the waters of the United States" defined or made clear. Not anywhere.

While ignorance of the law is never a defense for its violation, no American can be apprised of or know, not even the most seasoned and ancient criminal defense lawyer, all the hundreds of thousands of statutes and regulations any American must prescribe his conduct by at all times so as not to run afoul of the law.

In the Sacketts case, a couple in rural Idaho in 2008 were days away from clearing away their land (land which is close to Priest Lake but landlocked), in order to build their home. They had obtained all requisite local licenses and permits. The EPA visited them and announced that they were to cease and desist building or in any way doing anything with their land because it was on Federal wetlands and their affecting their land in any manner would constitute a violation of the Clean Water Act. The Sacketts asked for proof. The EPA pointed them to National Fish and Wildlife Wetlands Inventory. When the Sacketts showed the EPA that their property was not listed as a wetland according to the National Fish and Wildlife Wetlands Inventory, the EPA simply declined to provide any further rationale for its decision. It did however, issue an administrative compliance order stating that the Sackett's failure to cease and desist doing anything on their land would result in penalties of up to $75,000 per day for violations of the Clean Water Act plus possible criminal prosecution. The Order also required that the Sacketts fence off their property after replacing all the landfill they had cleared, replacing all the vegetation that had been removed, and that they monitor their now fenced in land, that they were not to otherwise touch, for a period of three years. The Sacketts asked the EPA for a hearing on the order but the EPA refused.

Due process would have required that the Sacketts receive some opportunity to be heard by the EPA or some reviewing entity. The Sacketts filed a complaint in Federal court for a review of the EPA's order under the APA. The Federal court dismissed the Sackett's complaint (the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the dismissal) on the grounds that they could not review the order because it was not a "final action" from EPA.

The Supreme Court's opinion written by Justice Scalia found that the Sacketts did have a right to judicial review of the Administrative Compliance Order because the Order "has all the hallmarks of APA finality" because it imposes legal obligations, states the penalties and other repercussions of non-compliance, and according to the EPA, final in that the EPA did not think it was subject to any further EPA review. Other than coming to Federal Court, the Sacketts had no other means of redress.

The Government argued that allowing judicial review of EPA actions would impede the EPA's ability to regulate land as efficiently. This is almost like saying that were there a judicial review (a actual check and balance on the EPA), of the EPA's compliance orders, the EPA would not be able to act with as much unbridled power. Justice Scalia was not impressed by the Government's logic when he replied that the APA's presumption of judicial review applies to other agencies and it,

is a repudiation of the principle that efficiency of regulation conquers all. And there is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of regulated parties into "voluntary compliance" without the opportunity for judicial review--even judicial review of the question whether the regulated party is within the EPA's jurisdiction
.


My favorite part of the decision was the concurring opinion written by Justice Alito, which ought to comfort property owners having to contend with the EPA, and chastises Congress for the perfectly unclear nature of the Clean Water Act.

Justice Alito writes,

The position taken in this case by the Federal Government--a position that the Court now squarely rejects-- would have put the property rights of ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) employees.

The reach of the Clean Water Act is notoriously unclear. Any piece of land that is wet at least part of the year is in danger of being classified by EPA employees as wetlands covered by the Act, and according to the Federal Government, if property owners begin to construct a home on a lot that the agency thinks possesses the requisite wetness, the property owners are at the agency's mercy.


The Sackett's get to return to Federal court but there is no guarantee they will prevail. This is far better than giving them or anyone else no recourse whatsoever when the EPA seemingly arbitrarily decides to violate an individual's property rights. Justice Alito,

The Court's decision provides a modest measure of relief. At least, property owners like petitioners will have the right to challenge the EPA's jurisdictional determination under the Administrative Procedure Act. But the combination of the uncertain reach of the Clean Water Act and the draconian penalties imposed for the sort of violations alleged in this case still leaves most property owners with little practical alternative but to dance to the EPA's tune. Real relief requires Congress to do what it should have done in the first place: provide a reasonably clear rule re- garding the reach of the Clean Water Act.


Sadly, Justice Alito's admonishment to Congress will likely go as far as the saying of throwing pearls before swine. Congress ought to pay more thought to what laws it writes. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that no one be made to guess, when their life and liberty is at stake, as to the meaning of a criminal statute. Violation of the Clean Water Act carries with it the possibility of criminal prosecution. Laws enforced by the EPA and other departments of the Executive Branch that carry the penalty of a loss of freedom must be absolutely clearly in apprising all of what conduct is prescribed and what is not. All must know what the Government commands or forbids. The Sackett case is an illustration of this but there are only about 300,000 other regulations that may or most likely may not apprise otherwise law-abiding Americans what the Government may or may not punish.@

R Tamara de Silva

Chicago, Illinois
March 21, 2012

R Tamara de Silva is an independent trader and lawyer

Footnotes:
1. http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-1062.pdf
2. From 2000 through 2007, Congress enacted 452 new criminal offenses. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Factsheets/2011/04/OVERCRIMINALIZATION-An-Explosion-of-Federal-Criminal-Law